



FIRST AS TO THE NATURE OF JURISPRUDENCE
This age marks the renaissance of jurisprudence. One epoch
in the development of sciences may with confidence be treated
as passed; never again among thinking and practical men will
the scientific and practical be contrasted. If one thing more
than any other marks the decade that is passing, it is the domina-
tion of scientific methods in all branches of human activity
except law.
This is the age of science. From now on we may expect to
hear practical scholars, jurists, and men of affairs contrast the
practical with the academic, or the scientific with the empirical,
but henceforth whoever repeats the old phrases formerly in
vogue among attorneys contrasting the theoretical and scientific
with the practical will be classed among the ignorant.
Science accompanies the farmer. in his sowing and his reaping,
the laborer at his task, the mechanic operates according to laws;
indeed science is everywhere predominant except among lawyers,
and at bar associations.
Just what is meant by science? No* doubt there are as many
definitions as there are viewpoints, .but after all there may be
seen through all of them and as the sum of all this simple idea,
the systematic research for and exposition of truth. The quest
may be as to mental operations, normal principles, physics, ethics,
social relations, business or war, but through it all science seeks,
finds and expounds. Science simplifies and makes appreciable
all it touches. Research and exposition are the processes of
scientific system; harmony and simplicity the result.
From two sources widely different the writer encountered the
expressions substantially as follows: "If science exists there
must be a philosophy of science, for there must be a reason for
the reliability of knowledge." The other: "If there is a science
of law it must have a basis. . . . I presume this is what is
meant by the philosophy of jurisprudence . . . unless there
is such a philosophy deeper down than the science, then the
science is falsely so called."
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Here is a suggestion that there is a difference between the
philosophy of jurisprudence and the science of jurisprudence.
There is an underlying philosophy constituting the merely
spiritual content of the science, there is also the formal expres-
sion and the material matter which constitutes the generally
recognized and visible matter of the subject: in our case the
institutions, elements, or norms of principle and rules of law.
Encompassing all of these is the science, or, as we say, the
jurisprudence.
Jurisprudence, then, is of the form; philosophy is of the
substance, though not all of the substance, the palpable things
mentioned being also of the substance, and indeed they constitute
the material body which we apprehend and expound and apply
as the law.
The distinctions here intimated, rather than explained, had been
made in the period of the classical jurists and these philosophers
and logicians saw and expressed clearly that science is the instru-
ment or means of giving formal expression to facts while
philosophy determined the truth of alleged facts. In this sense
philosophy is creative; science is constructive.
Of course in practical operation these elements are so associated
that the distinction is seldom made and in writing it is seldom
consistently observed. Nevertheless English jurists have kept in
mind that the soul or spirit of the law was a part and a very
substantial part of the law.
The creation of a system properly designated as scientific
requires: (a) the expression of all the component elements
or constituents of the whole subject; (b) a classification of these
in accordance with an appreciable principle which constitutes
a guide to the arrangement. The result is necessarily a formal
and visible picture displaying the whole as an articulate or
co6rdinate body in which each part is seen in relation to the
whole and the parts appear in reciprocal relation to each other-
this is a system. There is no isolation; there is organization.
In a system of law subjected to such treatment there can be
no real conflicts as to identical matter, though in a body of law
composed of a national jurisdiction with many stat6 jurisdic-
tions, there may be contrasts; these by the system must needs
be made apparent and being apparent and subjected to the light
of the underlying philosophy or reason, where harmony is
desirable the better reason is likely soon to prevail.
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The distinction between harmony and unity or identity must
in dealing with the law of distinct states be kept in mind.
Absolute identity of law throughout the states is not desirable,
discord where conditions are identical is deplorable.
In a recent number of the Harvard Law Review, Professor
Wigmore makes a plea for the establishment in the schools of
the same thing the writer has been advocating for the last twenty
years. Professor Wigmore expresses his idea in the dead lan-
guage of the Greek philosopher and handicaps it with the
necessity for the introduction of the old terminology. "The
Plea for the Science of Nomo-thetics,"' translated into modern
English as "A Plea for a Fixed Nomenclature and a Formal
Classification," ought to receive instant and hearty acceptance,
but the necessity or the utility of attempting the introduction of
a new nomenclature does not seem clear.
The ideas alluded to by Professor Wigmore 'are very simple
and have been expressed in all the languages in which the con-
tinuous progress of occidental civilization has been expressed.
Jurisprudence as the equivalent of the science of law sounds
as well as Nomology or nomo-logy.
But it is not the weak points of Professor Wigmore's argu-
ment which should be emphasized but the strong ones. No
practical shade of difference exists between the Greek Nomol-
ogy and the anglicized latin Jurisprudence, if the philosophical
element abo-e referred to is embraced within the content, as,
in truth, it must. A science so called would be mere dead and
dry formalism without the spirit of philosophy showing the
origin of and reason for its constituent truths.
A given mass of rules and principles is a mere mass lacking
entirely the harmony and unity and simplicity of a body until
science displays the mass as a system complete, coherent and
co6rdinate.
It is precisely at this point that American law is breaking down.
The reasons it is drifting into confusion are (a) that the philoso-
phy of the inner unity of all law is lost sight of and (b) the
science which gives it visible form as an integral system is
ignored.
In the' controversy over methods, the higher and more impor-
tant matter of the system has been forgotten.
If law is to be handled scientifically the paramount methods
of science must be invoked.
'Harvard Law Rev., vol. XXVIII, p. I.
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One of the philosophical writers mentioned above writes, "The
philosophy of science uses the formal sciences as the organ of
thought and supplies to the science of concrete phenomena the
method of establishing truth," elsewhere, "There are
always twc6 factors in establishing scientific truth . first,
sense and experience, and second, method. By method we mean
the function of handling the material, viz., identifying same-
nesses and differences, comparing phenomena, i. e., cla.ssifying
and contrasting them; tracing the succession of cause and effect,
and arranging the truths thus established into an harmonious
system."
II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE
Enough has already been said to suggest that a philosophy
of law had been developed by the Greek philosophers. The
ancient codes of course attest the long-established rules of law
applicable to daily life of the people.
The philosophers carried their inquiries deeper. They dis-
covered the "norms" and established a "logy" pertaining to
the social order with, of course, a vernacular nomenclature,
Nomology-Nomo Komios, etc. They carried their prognostica-
tions so far as to suggest the modem idea of nomocracy-or a
government of law. While here there is much of the philos-
ophy, there is little of the formal science as applied to the exposi-
tion of a specific body of law. The Greek did, however, furnish
the principle upon which a little later there was to be built
the first formal outlines upon which all modem systems of
jurisprudence have been erected.
The philosophy of the world was given the form of a science
in the first great university of the world. The philosophy of
Greece (or rather Alexandria) has ever since ruled the world,
but it was left for the genius of the Roman with a wider knowl-
edge and richer material to create a broad comprehensive system
upon foundations which have not been moved.
Whoever will examine carefully into the foundations and
elemental norms of the British system after its establishment
on "the rock which has not been submerged" will discover at
the base a principle which found its first expression in the
utopian dreams of the classical philosopher.
To the Aristotelian publicist the term justice implies the case of
those who have laws (nomoi) to which they are subject. In
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this view the terms justice and the law (nomos) connote the
same essential idea.
2
This idealism took the form of personifying the law under
the title King Nomos (nomocracy) or as the modem expres-
sion goes, the sovereignty of the law. 3 The common sense or
reason of the community, custom, mores, nomos are of the same
idea.
It is a far cry from the protest of Thersites to the theories of
the Greek politicians, dreary centuries elapse before the principle
of due process of law became the chief stone in the corner "the
rock that has not been submerged."
Modem law began with Magna Carta when no man could be
affected in his rights save by due process of law; jurisprudence
achieved its greatest triumph when political theories combined
with practical effort in the establishment of a government of
law. Through the struggle of the ages the theories of the
jurists begot the crowning triumph of civilization, justice
according to law.
The perpetuation of the system depends upon the recognition
of the manner of its origin and application of the principles of
its existence.
Just when modem formal jurisprudence began, and by whom
it was given its new impulse, will, of course, be matters of dis-
pute: whether to Irnerius, as Maitland believes, is due the
credit of establishing this human science alongside of theology,
or Bartolus, as Sohm affirms, or to Donellus, as Professor Pound
seems to declare, is likely to be a subject of dispute. Who is
the founder of the modern science of jurisprudence turns some-
what on the individual estimate of the nature and influence of
an event or effort, and the meaning of jurisprudence as denoting
more or less of philosophy and formal classification.
Indeed it is quite possible that there may be those who would
affirm that the Alpha and Omega of jurisprudence combined
when alphabetical arrangement took the place of classification
as a means of expounding law, or as they would say, when
the practical put aside the theoretical.
However this may be, the beginning of a pure science of
jurisprudence, i. e., a system of exposition based on a principle
'Smith, Crowned Essay. The State Am. Philosophical Soc., vol.
XXXIV, p. 298.
'Id., p. 316.. "Nomos is King and Reason his Counsellor." 43 Am. Law
Rev., 843. It is here that Austin's theories of Sovereignty breaks with
the British Constitution.
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of classification and executed with strict observance of well-
considered and xational methods, has been traced to a much
earlier period than one might be led, from a reading of Gibbons,
Chapter 44, to accept as the beginning of scientific jurisprudence.
Upon the subject of the creation of a jurisprudence such as is
contemplated by modem scholars, Professor Sohm has thisto say:
"The same Aelius whom we have just mentioned, sur-
named 'Catus,' 'the cunning' (Sextus Aelius Paetus
Catus, Consul i98 B. C.), had already composed a work,
called the 'commentaria tripertita,' in which, not content
with making a mere collection of formulae, he offered a
commentary on the Twelve Tables and the formulae for
actions and juristic acts. These 'commentaria' are, it
is true, nothing more than explanatory or exegetic notes,
but still they represent the first attempt to set forth the
pontifical jus civile in a literary form; they are the first
law book, the 'cradle of legal literature.' From this time
onward the technical knowledge of law passed more ana
more out of the hands of the pontifices and became an
ingredient in national culture. At the same time the
influence of Greek literature, and, more especially, the
scientific methods of the Stoic philosophy, operated as a
powerful and ennobling stimulant. The idea now sug-
gested itself of casting the hard materials of law into a
suitable artistic form. Thus, at an early date, we find
M. Porcius Cato, the younger (who died 152 B. C.),
making a conscious attempt to work out general principles
of law. (regulae juris), i. e., to trace in the raw material
of legal rules, as presented by history, the underlying legal
idea, to shape the statue from the rough block of marble.
The most distinguished of all these 'veteres' was Qu.
Mucius Scaevola, the younger, pontifex maximus. About
ioo B. C. he wrote his great treatise on the jus civile,
in eighteen books, a work of wide and enduring fame.
In this treatise the positive private law was, for the first
time, set forth in systematic order, i. e., arranged and
classified according to the nature of the subjects dealt
with. Scaevola's system remained the foundation for the
labours of his successors. He abandoned the traditional
legal arrangement of simply following the words of
statutes or of the formulae relating to procedure or
juristic acts, and adding explanatory notes. Nor did he
confine himself, like earlier writers, to the discussion of
isolated cases or questions of law. He arranged his work
according to the subject-matter with which the several
rules of law were concerned, and in which they were, so
to speak, focussed. He was the first to determine, in clear
outline, the nature of the legal institutions (will, legacy,
guardianship, partnership, sale, hiring, etc.), and their
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various kinds (genera). He made the first attempt to set
out general legal conceptions, i. e., those elements which go
to make up the checkered and, to all appearances, bound-
less mass of concrete facts. This is the secret of the great
significance and enormous success of his work. His
achievements rendered it possible, for the first time, to
survey private law arising as a whole beyond all the com-
plexities of detail. A mere knowledge of law was begin-
ning to develop into a legal science.""
The development of jurisprudence at the hands of the Romans
may be passed over with the mere mention of Gaius and Jus-
tinian, as marking the stages of a progressive improvement.
With the main portions of the Corpus Juris we are not at present
interested, excepting as the basis of the work of later civilians.
In the creation of a modern jurisprudence the work of the
Italian glossators constitutes the foundation of the edifice later
erected by the commentators.
The central figure in this effort is Irnerius. The true impor-
tance of his work is attested by no less authority than Professor
Maitland. ,
Professor Maitland says:
"A history of civilization would be miserably imperfect
if it took no account of the first new birth of Roman law
in the Bologna of Irnerius. Indeed there are who think
that no later movement-not the Renaissance, not the
Reformation--draws the stronger line across the annals
of mankind than that which is drawn about the year iioo
when a human science won a place beside theology." 5
Why is the methodical exposition of law (for that is the
highest power to which the work of the glossators can be
brought) spoken of as a human science and accorded such an
exalted place in the development of civilization?
It marks the effort to place human right or justice upon the
foundation of reason and philosophy, and just so far -as law
is made definite and justice is removed from individual caprice
and afforded a standard in common reason translated into com-
mon law, so far is there civilization.
The work of the commentators was vitally different and
whether the task of bringing to light the historical, philosophical
and economical basis or reason for law or the scientific task of
' Sohm's Inst., pp. go-i.
English Law and the Renaissance, Maitland.
JURISPRUDENCE
giving unity, harmony and order is the greater, will of course
depend upon the time and point of view.
Professor Sohm gives this estimate of the character and value
of the work of the commentator:
"The task, which had devolved upon Roman jurispru-
dence, and which it had (through the commentators) now
solved, had been a two-fold one:
"First, to consolidate into a uniform system the law that
lay stored up in all the manifold sources, from the time
of the Twelve Tables downwards;
"Secondly, to develop, in a scientific form, the abundance
of matter which these sources of law contained.
The problem here was to discover the true nature of the
dealings themselves, to trace the unexpressed and uncon-
scious intention underlying all such dealings, and having
traced it, to put'it into words, to clothe it in a form in
which definiteness and lucidity should be coupled with
a degree of comprehensiveness sufficient to bring out the
broad general principle governing, not merely a large
number of cases, but positively all cases, including those
which were peculiar and exceptional. SUCH A PROBLEM
TOUCHED THE CREATION RATHER THAN THE APPLICATION
OF LAW. But it was precisely in performing a task of
this kind that the genius of Roman jurisprudence came
most strikingly into play. In spite of its innate dialectic
strength and discipline, it had but few dogmatic interests
in the modern scientific sense of the term."
'
Bearing in mind that it is this modernized civil law and not
the ancient Roman law which was received throughout modern
Europe, we may note the one paramount effect of the labors
of truly scientific commentators, that is, the constant expansion
and adaptation of the common law, the jus gentium, by the
process of reason.
This is, in truth, the great phenomenon of jurisprudence, the
domination and permanency of principles and their adaptation
to ever changing conditions.
The effect of the jurist-made law on legislation is stated by
Sohm as follows:
"In interpreting the 'letter' of the statutes there was a
growing tendency, all reservations notwithstanding, to give
effect to the ideas of the new common law. The victory
of the common law was thus assured. Its strength lay
in the fact that it was founded on scientific principles, and
Sohm's Inst., pp. ioi-2.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
its signal practical triumph was dub to the special lalbors
of the Commentators. Just as the growth of a common
national art and literature tended to reduce the differences
of language and national character in Italy, so the suc-
cess of the new scientific movement tended to reduce the
existing differences in the law and to bring unity into the
legal ideas and habits of the people.
4 the fact that the law taught by the Commen-
tators ever became the actual common law of the country
was the outcome of this very theory that the statutes
should not be interpreted in the light of the statute law
itself, but in the light of the common law.
The foundations of modern Continental juris-
prudence were thus laid."
7
Whatever of jurisprudence England has had has been based
professedly upon the science of the Roman and civilian jurists;
another origin has been ascribed to the law of England but
that is a matter foreign to this article. The classification of
Gaius has been adopted and adapted with more or less skill
and with conscious imitation. Whether owing to the simplicity
of the subject, the adaptability of the laws or the power and
skill of the English jurists, their labors developed at one period
a formal exposition of the whole body of English law which
for fundamentalness, clearness and order has never been
surpassed.
That the results worked out by Hale, Dr. Wood and Black-
stone really deserve so high an estimate is attested by the jurists
whose labors in this field have enjoyed a high reputation among
jurists in the field of scientific legal exposition.
Dr. Heinrich Brunner, who for forty years has been in the
first rank of German jurists, wrote of Blackstone's effort as
follows:
"It may be boldly asserted that none of the modern
systems of law can show such a completed and rounded
exposition, on the whole, as the English system possesses
in Blackstone."
Chan-Toon (barrister of the Middle Temple), author of a
Treatise on Jurisprudence (1889), says:
"The origin of classifying departments of law may be
traced to the crude arrangement of the Twelve Tables,
and to the institutional writers, who afterwards rearranged
the laws contained in the first code of the Romans in
'Sohm's Inst., pp. 143-4-6.
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their commentaries. Gaius in his institutes represents
the analytical method of classification as conceived by
the classical. jurists. . .
The main divisions of law as perceived by Gaius and
the other institutional writers were implicitly followed
by the civilians, and are still adopted with varying quali-
fications by modern jurists . ..
There has been a tendency to find too much fault with
Blackstone. It must le acknowledged that he is the only
writer who has attempted, with substantial results, the
herculean task of writing the entire English Law. .
Comparing the classifications of the Roman jurists and
Blackstone's, we notice an improvement in the latter."
That the principles upon which the classical jurists based their
system have been so widely adopted has been attested by many
jurists.
The following will suffice our present purpose:
"The jurist Gaius, who died after i8o A. D., and whose
institutional treatise was adopted as a model by all sub-
sequent writers of legal textbooks, is the last in whom the
opposition between the schools is represented.
'8
"As regards Gaius himself, it is important to remember
that whatever reputation he acquired in later days and
however enduring has been his fame as the model for all
systematic treatise-writers on law, in his own time he was
only a private lecturer."9
Those who have studied the origin and progress of the sys-
tem of law originally established in this country need no argu-
ment as to the constructive 'and unifying power of the labors
of the great English commentator, but since in the last half-
century the regard for Blackstone has been allowed to wane
and the use of the institutional system of which his book was
the highest exponent has to a large extent been discontinued, it
may not be amiss to show by the highest expert opinion the
constructive and unifying influence of Blackstone's Commen-
taries in moulding and fashioning the law of this country.
Maitland, in a lecture at Oxfor4, published under the title
"English Law and the Renaissance," graphically flashes the
picture and points a tacit admonition:
"James Kent, aged-fifteen, found a copy, and (to use
his own words) was inspired with awe; John Marshall
•Sohm's Inst, p. 98.
Abdy & Walker's Gaius, Cambridge, Eng., i87o, Int. VII.
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found a copy in his father's library; AND THE COMMON
LAW WENT STRAIGHT TO THE PACIFIC.
"A hundred legislatures-little more or less-are now
building on that foundation; on the rock that was not
submerged. We will not say this boastfully. Far from
it. . . If unity of law-such unity as there has been-
disappears, much else that we treasure will disappear
also, and (to speak frankly), unity of law is precarious."'-0
The lesson drawn from this and the experience of the ages
is this. That at the center or bottom of all systems which have
emerged from the condition of mere arbitrary power there is
the unifying principle of natural reason (call it jus gentium or
common law), and unless stifled it will prevail and ,will dominate
all forms of law.
III
THE PRACTICAL VOCATION OF JURISPRUDENCE
In considering the practical vocation of jurisprudence it is
assumed that we are regarding the subject from the point of
its expository functior; rather than from an explanation of the
creative function which has through all time been a very marked
feature of the purely philosophic or academic phase of the
science, for it must not be overlooked that a very large propor-
tion of law is jurist-made rather than judge-made.
It is to be remarked that jurists and judges always profess
merely to declare and perhaps it is true that both the judges and
the jurists are chanticleers rather than authors of light, merely
declaring the advent of what other causes bring to pass.",
At this point it is necessary to point out the special fields in
which jurisprudence operates.
The first of these is purely constructive, consisting entirely
of making the law knowable. This is accomplished by means
of codification, i. e., exposition under legal sanction and formal
exposition by means of books, comprehensive or topical, but
always scientifically classified. Every effort to make the law
knowable and reduce it to a system is an effort in jurisprudence.
Alphabetical and other unclassified discourses always tend
to disintegrate and throw the law into confusion.
. Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance, pp. 32-3.
"See Le Baron B. Colt, Law and Reasonableness. Am. Bar Ass'n Rep.,
voL XXVI (1903), p. 341.
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The experience of the world proves that the fundamental
primary and ultimate book, establishing and preserving order
and harmony in the law, in a word creating a system, is the
so-called institutional treatise.
Without such a book, generally accepted, there can be no
jurisprudence worthy of the name. With such a book scien-
tifically classifying the contents of the law, and bringing clearly
to the foreground the permanent institutions, the dominating
principles, the main rules and leading and ruling precedents;
accepted and sanctioned as it should be by the legal profession,
no body of law can fall into confusion. Such a system tends
to uniformity, consistency and harmony.
The first effort in any comprehensive reformation of Ameri-
can law must be the creation of a system of classification
expressed in an institutional commentary. Until this is done all
other efforts will be transitory and barren of results.
Grueber, in a review of Holtzendorff's encyclopedia,' 2 says:
"In order to codify existing law it must have previously existed
in the form of a scientific system, i. e., in the form of rules
which are . . . arranged according to certain leading con-
ceptions."
The first effort of every codifier is of course classification.
Mr. Justice Holmes had the perception that saw that the neces-
sity for codification was almost met by a thorough and scientific
classification.
When our jurists and legislators see this, they will bend
their energies to a cobperative effort to produce a real classifi-
cation of existing law.
The next field for the efficient practical application of jurispru-
dence is in the field of legislation. It is gratifying to observe
that this is already engaging the attention of the legislatures in
some states and that bar associations are co6perating. It is to
be regretted that nowhere has any appreciation been shown of
the fundamental scientific truth that a system must be first created
before the work of compelling legislation to conform to order
and consistency.
That jurisprudence should dominate legal education is so
obvious that no one will argue against it.
That jurisprudence, properly so-called, has no place in any
of our larger colleges of law, as a means of imparting a broad
i1 Law Quarterly Review, p. 62.
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comprehension of the law as a system and a clear apprehension
of the reciprocal and co6rdinating relation of the parts, is a
fact which most of those teaching in the schools will admit.
That scientific methods of imparting and acquiring a knowl-
edge of the origin and development of the rules and principles
and their illustration by precedents are in use in all schodls
may be admitted and that these methods are elements in any
system of jurisprudence may also be admitted. This does not,
however, by any means, involve a contradiction of the second
proposition above stated.
The importance of making jurisprudence the dominating ele-
ment in even the vocational or professional law school cannot
be over-estimated. By no other means can a comprehensive,
complete and fundamental conception of the law or of any part
of the law be given. In no other way can a uniform and
harmonious conception be given to the whole body of lawyers.
No codification or systematic restatement of law can main-
tain the harmony of the law unless the legal profession is edu-
cated in accordance with its fundamental concepts and are
familiar with its classification and why such classification pre-
vails. The law schools educating the youth who to-morrow will
be the lawyer and shortly the magistrate have the great oppor-
tunity and the corresponding obligation.
In the last seventy-five years the law qchools have increased
from about ten to over one hundred and ten. The lawyers have
increased from a few thousand to over one hundred thousand.
But in the meantime, what of the law? Is our law progressing
satisfactorily either in substance or in form? Is the profession
maintaining its high place relatively in the esteem' and regard
of the people? Is it performing its high functions with close
approximation to the high ideals its teachers are so prone to
dwell upon on high occasions? Are the law schools performing
to the highest degree their obligation to furnish the most scientific
education?
The occasion for argument over either of these questions
is long since past; an opinion as to each will perhaps impress the
apathetic. Among the latest expressions of the late Judge Horn-
blower is this: "The present condition of the law is little short
of appalling."
At the meeting of the American Bar Association at Montreal,
ex-President Taft dwelt upon the waning prestige of the bar.
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As the third question, passing by familiar admonitions and
pleas for the introduction of jurisprudence in the schools, atten-
tion is directed to arguments from different sources.
In an official memorial issued by Johns Hopkins University
is the following:
"A Law School of High Grade.-There is need for the
establishment of a: School of Jurisprudence which will
furnish instruction in the higher branches of the law and
opportunity for scientific research-historical, comparative
and critical.
There is at present no such institution in the country,
all other law schools being wholly vocational or profes-
sional in character. The opportunity is thus offered to
inaugurate in the field of law, public and private, the
same scientific methods that have given such distinction
to the Johns Hopkins Medical School in the field of
medicine."
That Dean Langdell had in the beginning of his efforts the
conception of a system and the utility of giving this system
expression in a comprehensive form appears dearly in the
introduction to his first book of cases. He writes:
"Law considered as a science consists of certain prin-
ciples or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as
to be able to apply them with consistent facility and cer-
tainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs is what
constitutes a true lawyer. . . . Moreover the number
of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is com-
monly supposed; the many different guises in which the
same doctrine is constantly making its appearance and
the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition
of each other being the cause of much misapprehension.
IF THESE DOCTRINES COULD BE SO CLASSIFIED AND ARRANGED
THAT EACH SHOULD BE FOUND IN ITS PROPER PLACE AND
NO WHERE ELSE THEY WOULD CEASE TO BE FORMIDABLE
FROM THEIR NUMBER."
That his whole effort is one of classification is perfectly clear.
That each topic is but a part of a co~rdinated whole was likewise
plainly stated.
The arguments in favor of the scientifically arranged treatise
as an outline presenting the elements of the law and all the
elements, i. e., the institutions as well as the principles, doctrines,
rules and illustrations of application, are mere corollaries.
That the case method of instruction developed upon one of
the lines indicated, while the classification of tle whole sub-
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ject of study, viz., the body of American Law, was not kept
up, is of course now well understood. The reason is not diffi-
cult to understand and has recently been very clearly explained.
The neglect of the system as a system, that is, classified
institutes, in the so-called textbook schools resulted from the
same causes but was and is less justifiable. Topical textbooks
and topical lectures can no more supply the deficiency than can
carefully selected cases on leading subjects or topics, and the
latter, given time and competent instructors, are more valuable
as means of teaching the origin, reasons and application of
principles, doctrines and rules.
If a choice were necessary as between the two methods, few
would find difficulty in making it, but no such choice is neces-
sary and in actual experience is not made or advised by any
one anywhere.
The weakness of both methods is that they dwarf, if they
do not entirely ignore, an essential part of a broad and com-
prehensive legal education. The result as shown by two genera-
tions of experience is that the law is becoming confused and
uncertain, that it is losing its quality of fixedness or due process,
as a natural consequence the profession is losing its relative
prestige. The cause of all the trouble and compla'int is the lack
of a genuinely scientific legal system.'3 "This," says Professor
Redlich, "is primarily due to the fact that, up to the present,
legal science has not kept pace with the remarkable wealth of the
common law in legal substance."'1 Here it is that legal education
has failed of performing its highest function.
The condition and the remedy are concisely stated by Dr.
Redlich in the report referred to.
"Herein we find the strength, but herein also the weak-
nesses of the case method. These weaknesses, to sum up
the writer's opinion in a word, lie on the scientific side
of American legal instruction in its present form. In this
connection we may distinguish between, first, the influence
exerted by the case method upon the scientific comprehen-
sion of law by the students, that is to say, upon legal
instruction proper, and secondly, its reaction upon the
scientific elaboration of law in general, that important
function of law faculties which we must consider apart
from their purely pedagogic aims.
" Pound, Taught Law, 37 Am. Bar Ass'n Rep., p. 975.
" Report of Dr. Redlich on the Case Method. Bulletin No. VIII,
Carnegie Foundation for Teaching, p. 6i.
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"With respect to the first point, it seems to me that the
following consideration is of some importance. It is char-
acteristic of the case method that where it has thoroughly
established itself, legal education has assumed the form
of instruction almost exclusively through analysis of
separate cases. The result of this is that the students
never obtain a general picture of the law as a whole, not
even a picture that includes only its main features. This
is, in my opinion, however, just as important for the study
of Anglo-American law as for the codified continental
systems, and is a task which should also be accomplished
by the law courses in the universities. To this end, the
following seems to me above all things requisite:
"First, as an introduction to the entire curriculum, care
should be taken to introduce to the student, in elementary
fashion, the fundamental concepts and legal ideas that are
common to all divisions of -the common law. Or, to
express it in a word common in European pedagogy, the
beginners in American law schools should be given a
legal Propideutik, or preparatory course, which in a simple
yet scientific manner shall set forth the elements of the
common law, shall furnish, that is to say, a comprehensive
view of the permanent underlying concepts, forms, and
principles, not forgetting the elementary postulates of law
and legal relationships in general. The more rigorously
casuistic the case method of instruction which then follows
necessarily has to be, the more important it seems to me
it is to make clear to the students, at the very beginning
certain fundamental facts and guideposts of the law which
are removed from all casuistry and theoretical controversy.
Only in this way will their future studies rest upon a
solid and scientifically grounded foundation."
The one-sidedness, the narrowness and shortsightedness of
ignoring or slighting the one element essential to a scientific
system and exaggerating another, even of equal value, are also
strongly stated by him.
"I have, however, in my positive suggestions also pointed
to the necessity of supplementing these analytic exercises,
both at .the beginning and at the conclusion of the course,
by scientific, systematic lectures, and finally I have also
referred to the fact that a more extensive growth of
scientific legal literature in the United States may be
expected with full certainty from the forces now at work,
and fortunately so, for the reason that it seems essential
to further progress. Therefore I do not hesitate to say
again expressly that the unqualified rejection of the lec-
ture from the curriculum of the university law schools,
and the extraordinary slighting of literary aids to the
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study of law, seems an error and a prejudice which has
its origin in an undoubted exaggeration of the value of
the analytic method in and for itself, and possibly also
in an exaggeration of the value in scientific instruction of'method' in general."' 15
The great problems which lie before us, the solution of which,
for the United States as well as for the world,. it is the practical
vocation of jurists by means of the application of jurisprudence
to work out, are thus stated by Dr. Redlich:
"Herewith, I believe, however, that the two great prob-
lems are revealed whose solution devolves upon American
jurisprudence: the creation of a scientific system of the
common law, and a reform of the common law in the
direction of that movement which is becoming more and
more pronounced among the people of the United States
in favor of a simplification, a greater efficiency and
improvement, of substantive law as well as of civil and
criminal procedure."
The vocation of jurisprudence is plain: the practical utility
of that vocation has been demonstrated by many examples. The
question before the profession and all its branches, teachers of
law, judges, practitioners and legislators is simply this: will they
co6perate in an effort to re~stablish jurisprudence as a vital
part of the law.
Efficient effort must not be individual, sectional, or, as we may
say, sectarian but must be real co6peration in an effort to bring to
bear upon the problem the best brain power of the nation.
The ideal must not be to create a system for one school but
a system of education which shall faithfully portray the linea-
ments, the framework, the vital forces, the practical functions
of the actual corpus juris existing everywhere alike.
Let there be generous rivalry as to methods but there must
be cordial co6peration to create the system and give its outlines
substance, and principles the form of a scientifically classified
system.
Let me close with the sentiment of the late Judge Dillon:
"There is here room and need for all. The institutional
writer, the law teacher, the philosophic student, the scien-
tific jurist, the experienced lawyer, the learned judge, the
aId., p. 54.
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practical legislator, has each his place. They are not
repellant and antagonistic agencies, but allies and co-
laborers in the noblest work that can engage the attention
and draw forth and exemplify the highest powers of the
human intellect. Toward the realization of this ideal let
us press on with generous ardor."
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